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COMMENTS
FREE CHOICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
OR
WOULD You READ THIS IF I HELD IT IN YouR
FACE AND REFUSED To LEAVE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen "to
reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be
opportunity to win their attention."' As a summary of the First
Amendment's scope, however, this statement is incomplete. In most
circumstances, the First Amendment also protects the right of citi-
zens to reach the minds of unwilling listeners, even those who may
respond violently to the objectionable speech. Supreme Court pre-
cedent firmly upholds the right of speakers to express views that
provoke and anger audiences even to the point of inciting riot; the
state may restrict such speech only if it poses a clear and present
danger of producing imminent lawless action.2 When confronted by
speech that is any less offensive, audiences must attempt to avoid
the speech?
Because the First Amendment protects the opportunity to reach
unwilling listeners, targeted protests constitute protected activity.
Targeted protests, those conducted directly before the audience
whose views or behavior the protesters oppose, represeni a para-
digm of First Amendment activity. Reflecting a "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
1. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
2. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 444 (1969).
3. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"4 any restriction on such pro-
tests receives careful scrutiny.5 Targeting the location of a protest
may enhance its eloquence and power. The import of the numerous
marches on Washington throughout American history ensued not
simply from their magnitude, but from the symbolic meaning of
marching before the various institutions of power-the White
House, the Capitol, and the memorials of the great presidents.
Conducting the protest at the site of the subject of the protest may
also contribute to the message itself: the views of black civil rights
activists who sat at lunch counters reserved for whites were unmis-
takable. Although selecting the site of the speech may be character-
ized as conduct rather than pure speech, protecting citizens' right
to target their protests may be particularly valuable.
Beyond the enhanced symbolic and communicative effect of a
targeted protest, the impact on the citizens whose activities the
protesters oppose and hope to influence will be particularly acute.
If the protest fulfills its ultimate goal, the targeted audience will
alter its behavior to comport with the protesters' views. While
guarding the right of citizens to attempt to influence public policy
through the exercise of speech is, arguably, the underlying purpose
of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that
certain interests of the targeted audience may deserve and require
the protection of the state against infringement by such protests.
Preserving the audience's freedom from coercion tempers the
protection afforded the protesters' persuasive activities.
This Comment surveys audience-related interests recognized by
the Supreme Court as potentially compelling to justify restricting
protesters in their exercise of First Amendment rights. Part II sum-
marizes the constitutional doctrines regarding offensive speech and
speech before a captive audience. These principles reflect the Su-
preme Court's willingness to protect audiences from invasions of
privacy by speech that intolerably disturb their environments. Re-
viewing cases in which the Supreme Court balanced the First
Amendment rights of protesters who targeted their audience and the
interests of the targets themselves, Part III investigates the Court's
concern that the audience's privacy may be invaded in another
manner. The decisions suggest that protesters' First Amendment
rights may be restricted if their expressive activity has a coercive
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
5. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
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effect upon the targeted audience, intolerably interfering in the
audience's decisions in matters related to the protests. This Com-
ment concludes that a decision to protect the audience from such
coercive interference finds support in First Amendment theory.
II. PRIVACY OF ENVIRONMENT
A. Protection of Offensive Speech
As a general rule, the Constitution offers citizens little govern-
mental protection against speech that might offend them, even if
the speaker intends the offense. "If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable."6  Objectionable speech,
whether or not itself constituting truth, must compete in the mar-
ketplace of ideas to advance the pursuit of truth.' The equal status
of offensive expression among ideas is a necessary component of
the process of self-governance. "Just so far as ... the citizens who
are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that
issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered . . . ."' Exposure
to offensive speech also advances tolerance among the populace
By responding as rational agents to an offensive expression, citi-
zens promote their own self-respect and autonomy.' Finally, to
6. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
7. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
('mhe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket.').
8. ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26 (1948).
9. See Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REv. 617, 629 (1982) ("The free speech principle is
grounded as much in a desire to avoid being the slaves of our own intolerant impulses as
it is in a desire to preserve an unshackled freedom to speak one's mind as one wishes.").
10. See David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 61-62 (1974) (asserting that the value
placed on the freedom of ideas "derives from the notion of self respect that comes from
a mature person's full and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to human rationali-
ty').
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allow the government to assume a protective role against offensive
speech forfeits that individual autonomy," and carries with it the
threat of government censorship.
2
Despite the numerous theories constraining the state's interfer-
ence in the marketplace of ideas, the Supreme Court has upheld
the right of the government to protect citizens from certain catego-
ries of objectionable speech. Pursuant to the state's power to pro-
tect public safety and order, it may prevent a speaker from inten-
tionally provoking a given group to a hostile or unlawful reaction
that presents a clear and present danger to the public. 3 Personal
insults directed to a specific individual may also be banned or
punished, for the words "by their very utterance inflict injury ...
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."' 4 The state may also prohibit speech that of-
fends the audience because it is obscene, both because it is offen-
sive and because it lacks value in the pursuit of truth. 5 Beyond
these traditional exceptions, the First Amendment jurisprudence
prohibits the government from restricting speech due to its objec-
tionable effect on the audience.
11. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 204,
213-18 (1972) (arguing that citizens who are autonomous could not accept the judgment
of others as to what they should believe or do, and could not concede to the state the
right to have its decrees obeyed without deliberation).
12. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("it is a central
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace
of ideas"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (noting with apprehension the
correlation of government's censorship of modes of expression with its censorship of
unpopular viewpoints).
13. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). While the speech would present no
danger if the expression were not offensive to the audience, the rationale for the "hostile
audience" doctrine is not the protection of the audience from the objectionable expression,
but the protection of citizens in general from the hostile reaction of those who take of-
fense. "'When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the
power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."' Id. at 320 (citing Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).
14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The "fighting words"
doctrine also protects society from speech that, when viewed objectively, tends to incite
an immediate breach of peace. Id.
15. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (articulating the basic guidelines
for establishing obscenity).
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B. Intolerable Invasions of the Environment
Rather than allowing the government to regulate offensive
speech, the Supreme Court suggests the burden rests upon the
individual as a responsibility attendant to democracy.
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful med-
icine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of
each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ulti-
mately produce a more capable citizenry, and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would com-
port with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests. 6
Thus, as a rule, the primary obligation to protect citizens from
offensive speech belongs to each citizen herself. The state's protec-
tive role is strictly limited: "The ability of government, consonant
with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others
from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."' 7
Constitutional doctrines balancing a speaker's First Amendment
rights against the interests of listening audiences recognize a view
of privacy that reflects the listener's right not to be disturbed with-
in a particular environment."8 In Cohen v. California,9 the Court
16. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
17. Id. at 21. In developing this rule of Cohen, this Comment concerns "privacy"
involving unwanted exposure to objectionable speech, as distinguished from "privacy"
involving the unwanted disclosure of personal, nonpublic information. See, e.g., Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (refusing to sanction the press for
publishing a deceased rape victim's name as the information had appeared in public court
documents).
18. The following discussion of how the context, primarily the location, of the commu-
nication influences the Supreme Court's perspective on relevant audience interests is not
entirely detached from the modem "public forum" analysis, under which the Court adjusts
the protection afforded First Amendment activity based on whether the speech occurs in a
traditional public forum, a public forum created by government designation, and a
nonpublic forum. See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). According to the
Court, however, both "the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have
remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to
the speech in question.' Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974).
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reversed the conviction of a man who appeared in the Los Angeles
Municipal Court wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words
"Fuck the Draft."'2 Responding to the argument that the state act-
ed legitimately to protect sensitive citizens from the man's "crude
form of protest,"'21 the Court charged those in the Los Angeles
courthouse who wished to "avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply [to] avert[] their eyes." Within the courthouse
environment, the visual presence of the offensive words was not an
intolerable privacy invasion as it easily could be excluded.
The Cohen Court noted a greater interest in privacy within the
courthouse than in a public park or street.' In these open, public
areas, the audience's burden to avoid the speech may be greater.
Even large displays of potentially offensive expression in these
spaces, such as the exhibition of motion pictures containing nudity
on a drive-in movie screen visible from a public street,24 are not
essentially intolerable privacy invasions. Unwilling audiences re-
main responsible for averting their eyes to avoid continued expo-
sure to the speech.' Where the location does not prevent the lis-
tener from protecting himself, privacy interests abate and a listener
able to avoid offensive speech is expected to take action.
C. The Home as a Protected Environment
The home constitutes a special realm in which a listener's
interest in not being disturbed attains the status of a right, justify-
ing a diminished obligation to tolerate offensive speech. Within the
confines of the home, an "individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." 6 Thus, the
Court upheld a ban against broadcasting indecent or profane lan-
This Comment assumes the location of the speech may inform both inquiries: the public
or nonpublic nature of the forum as well as the conflicting interests involved.
19. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
20. Id. at 16. The Court established that the expression was not obscene, nor a direct
personal insult so as to constitute "fighting words," nor an intentional provocation of a
group to a hostile reaction. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 21. The wearer of the jacket testified that the jacket expressed to the public
the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id.
24. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
25. Id. at 212.
26. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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guage, for the offensive material confronted citizens not only in
public but within the home. Although a homeowner could avoid
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears the offen-
sive speech, privacy interests supersede the speaker's First
Amendment rights; "the home [is] the one place where people
ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and of-
fensive sights and sounds."27
Beyond offensive content, speech may intolerably invade a
private environment due to the means of its communication. Home-
owners need not sacrifice "the[ir] quiet and tranquility ... at the
mercy of advocates." Thus, the Court has condoned regulation of
the use of sound amplification equipment in residential areas29 and
parks surrounding them," the right of a homeowner to stop the
flow of unwanted mail into the home," and has acknowledged the
right of homeowners to control the occurrence of door-to-door
leafletting or solicitation.32
Confronting a direct conflict between the First Amendment
rights of protesters and the residential privacy interests of a target-
ed audience, the Supreme Court upheld the state's interest in pro-
tecting the home from disturbances of a physical or environmental
nature. In Frisby v. Schultz,33 the suburb of Brookfield, Wisconsin
experienced some peaceful picketing34 that occurred on a public
27. Id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority compared requiring a homeowner
to avoid the material by turning off the radio to saying that the remedy for an assault is
to run away after the first blow. Id. at 749-50. The nature of broadcast material also
implicated the Court's concern for children who could easily hear the offensive speech.
Id.
In Pacifica, the offensiveness of the speech was undisputed. See id. at 747. Where
the offensiveness of speech was disputed, the Court promoted the homeowner's control
over the flow of speech into the home; "[W]e have never held that the government itself
can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be
offended." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (invalidating a
federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives).
28. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). The need for tranquility to carry out
the function of a particular building extends to "courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals."
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
29. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89.
30. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
31. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
32. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943). While Martin invali-
dated a speech restriction, the Court asserted the rights of householders to indicate that
they are unwilling to be disturbed by door-to-door distribution of literature. Id.
33. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
34. The Court stated that the town never had occasion to invoke any of its ordinances
prohibiting obstruction of the streets, loud and unnecessary noises, or disorderly conduct
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street outside the personal residence of a doctor who performed
abortions at clinics in neighboring towns. Following controversy,
the town enacted an ordinance that banned all residential picket-
ing.35 Threatened with arrest, the picketers sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging
that the ordinance violated the First Amendment.36
Ultimately concluding that the ban was sufficiently narrowly
tailored to advance the state's ends,37 the Court emphasized the
conflict between residential protesters' First Amendment rights and
the basic principle of the home's sanctity. The ordinance itself
recited its primary purpose: "the protection and preservation of the
home [through assurance that] members of the community enjoy in
their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and
privacy."" Citing two earlier cases involving residential picket-
ing,39 the Court stressed that "'[p]reserving the sanctity of the
home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to
escape from the tribulations of their dally pursuits, is surely an
against the picketers. Id. at 476. The existence of the ordinances, and the fact that any
environmental disturbance created by the residential picketing was insufficient to trigger
the ordinances, supports that the drafters of the subsequent ban on picketing at issue in
Frisby intended to protect the targeted homeowner from other offensive effects. The
Court's willingness to uphold the ban confirms the legitimacy of the statutory propose.
See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 476-77. The ordinance prohibited any person from engaging in "picketing
before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield."
See id. at 477.
36. Id.
37. The Court imposed a narrowing construction upon the ordinance and found that the
ordinance targeted only picketing of a single residence. Id. at 483. Only in light of this
restrictive construction, did the ordinance allow protesters, alone or in groups, to enter
residential neighborhoods and proselytize door-to-door. Id. at 484. Because of these ample
alternatives to the focused picketing proscribed by the ordinance, the ordinance withstood
constitutional challenge. Id. at 488. Justice White's concurring opinion noted that the
language could easily be construed to reach also picketing that would deliver the desired
message about a particular residence to the neighbors, as well as picketing that is directed
at the residences which are located in entire blocks or in larger residential areas. Id. at
489 (White, J., concurring).
38. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988). The Town Board believed a ban was
necessary because it determined that "the practice of picketing before or about residences
and dwellings causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants . . . [and] has
as its object the harassing of such occupants." Id. The Town also expressed concern that
picketing obstructs and interferes with the free use of public sidewalks and ways of trav-
el. Id.
39. The Court relied upon Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), and
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), for the proposition that the home's sanctity sup-
ports limitations on speakers' First Amendment rights. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
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important value."'" Within this protected realm, the Court assert-
ed, "[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an
unwilling listener."4' The homeowners had a preexisting right to
exclude unwanted speech from intruding; the First Amendment did
not enable protesters to force unwanted speech into the enclave of
the home.42
D. The Captive Audience Doctrine
The homeowner's captivity in Frisby exacerbated the offensive-
ness of the speech's intrusion. The speech was unavoidable; "[tihe
resident [wa]s figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the
home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picket-
ing [wa]s left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted
speech."'43 The Court shields the home from invasion by offensive
speech not simply because of its sanctity, but because the home-
owner cannot easily relocate as a means of avoiding the speech.
Protecting captive listeners from forced exposure to speech
within a physically confined environment constitutes a recognized
exception to the general free speech principle. The captive audience
doctrine mediates between a speaker's right to free expression and
the rights of an unwilling audience whose choice to avoid the
speech is compromised by the circumstances of the communica-
tion." Because the listener cannot escape the disturbance by leav-
ing the environment, the speech invades her privacy interests in an
essentially intolerable manner, justifying a restriction upon the
speaker's First Amendment rights.4'
The audience's physical confinement is the prominent character-
istic of the captive audience doctrine. As in Frisby,' a
homeowner's captivity within her home supports restrictions on
40. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471).
41. Id. at 485. The Court contrasted the listener within the home to those on the
street, citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975), or in a
public building, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971). In either of these
locations the listener did not enjoy the "special benefit of privacy all citizens enjoy within
their own walls." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
42. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85.
43. Id at 487.
44. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
45. Id. at 304.
46. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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speech which invades the home.47 Yet "we are often 'captives'
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech."'  Thus the captive audience doctrine asserts citizens'
rights to be free from forced exposure to objectionable speech
outside the home as well.
Confinement within a rapid transit car typifies the captive
audience. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,49 the city sold
advertising space on car cards in the vehicles of its public rapid
transit system. The city and the company that managed the adver-
tising space agreed that political advertising would not appear in or
upon any of the cars of the rapid transit system."0
A candidate for public office attempted to purchase advertising
space on rapid transit cars for the months preceding the election.5
The city refused to permit his advertisements. 2 Upholding the
city's decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that "'[t]he streetcar
audience is a captive audience."'53 Since the audience rode the
streetcar "as a matter of necessity, not of choice,"' 4 the riders had
47. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) ("In
today's complex society we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a
sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every householder to
exercise control over unwanted mail.").
48. Id. at 738.
49. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
50. Metromedia had a written advertising policy establishing the following criteria:
(1) Metro Transit Advertising will not display advertising copy that is false,
misleading, deceptive and/or offensive to the moral standards of the community,
or contrary to good taste. Copy which might be contrary tho the best interests
of the transit systems, or which might result in public criticism of the advertis-
ing industry and/or transit advertising will not be acceptable.
(2) Metro Transit Advertising will not accept any political copy that pictorially,
graphically or otherwise states or suggests that proponents or opponents of the
persons or measures advertised are vulgar, greedy, immoral, monopolistic, illegal
or unfair ....
(10) Political advertising will not be accepted on following systems: Shaker
Rapid-Maple Heights-North Olmstead-Euclid, Ohio.
Id. at 300 n.l.
51. The petitioner's proposed copy read as follows:
"HARRY J. LEHMAN IS OLDFASHIONED! ABOUT HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND
GOOD GOVERNMENT. State Representative-District 56 [X] Harry J. Lehman."
The advertisement also contained the petitioner's picture. Id. at 299.
52. Id. at 301.
53. Id. at 301-02 (quoting Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468
(1952) (Douglas, J. dissenting)).
54. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Packer
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no choice whether to observe the advertising. Because circum-
stances inhibited the audience's freedom to avoid the speech, the
Court subordinated the First Amendment rights of the speaker.55
Justice Douglas' concurrence unequivocally asserted the privacy
rights of the captive audience:
In asking us to force the system to accept his message
as a vindication of his constitutional rights, the petitioner
overlooks the constitutional rights of the commuters ....
In my view the right of the commuters to be free from
forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from
transforming its vehicles of public transportation into fo-
rums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audi-
ence.
56
The Justices disagreed on the issue of the intolerable nature of
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
55. Id. at 304. Despite the importance of political speech in the history of the free
speech guarantee, see, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAPEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18-
20 (1941) (describing the framers' fear of the danger to political writers and speakers
posed by rigorous and repeated prosecutions for seditious libel); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
8, at 24-28 (describing the theoretical foundation of the free speech guarantee as a means
of contributing to and enhancing the process of self-government), the political nature of
the speech reinforced the danger of forcing riders' exposure to it. "Users would be sub-
jected to the blare of political propaganda .... In these circumstances, the managerial
decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and ser-
vice oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation."
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304. Justice Douglas' concurrence expressly characterized "the con-
tent of the message as irrelevant both to the petitioner's right to express it or to the
commuters' right to be free from it. "Commercial advertisements may be as offensive and
intrusive to captive audiences as any political message." Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). In addition to the interests of the captive audience itself, the Court also weighed
the interests of the city: "There could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky
administrative problems mights arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians."
Id. at 304.
56. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring). Interestingly, travelers continue
to capture the sympathy of several Justices. In International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1992), the Court invalidated a ban on the
distribution of literature in port authority airport terminals. While the Court held that a
ban on solicitation adequately redressed the inconveniences to passengers and the burdens
on terminal officials, the dissent would allow a ban on distribution.
The weary, harried, or hurried traveler may have no less desire and need to
avoid the delays generated by having literature foisted upon him than he does
to avoid delays from a financial solicitation. And while a busy passenger per-
haps may succeed in fending off a leafletter with minimal disruption to himself
by agreeing simply to take the proffered material, this does not completely
ameliorate the dangers of congestion flowing from such leafletting.
Id. at 2710 (Rehnqui$t, J., dissenting).
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the privacy invasion. Dissenting, Justice Brennan denied that the
audience was powerless to avoid the speech. Because the advertise-
ments were written, not broadcast over loudspeakers on the transit
cars, the passengers' privacy was not "dependent upon their ability
'to sit and to try not to listen."' 57 Asserting that offended passen-
gers could just as easily avert their eyes as the Court directed in
Cohen,58 the dissent characterized the "minor inconvenience . . . a
small price to pay for the continued preservation of so precious a
liberty as free speech."59
The captive audience cases are a subset of cases in which the
Court defends the privacy interests of audiences from intolerable
invasions by a speaker's First Amendment activity. In most circum-
stances, an audience that wishes to enjoy a particular environment
without invasion by offensive speech must usually assume responsi-
bility for avoiding the speech.6' Under established doctrines, per-
missible governmental restrictions shield audiences from speech
within a specially protected realm6' or where the audience cannot
elect to leave the environment.62
When mediating among the interests of speakers who conduct a
targeted protest, and the interests of their targeted audiences, the
Court relies on principles from the offensive speech and captive
audience cases. The speech, expressed to communicate the
speaker's opposition to the audience's policy or behavior, may be
offensive simply by being contrary or challenging to the audience's
position, or it may actually contain objectionable language to em-
phasize the speaker's opposing viewpoint. The Court considers
whether, within the environment in which the speech occurs, the
First Amendment rights of the protesters impose upon the audience
the burden of avoiding the speech, or whether the speech disturbs
the captive audience's environment in an essentially intolerable
manner. Throughout the Supreme Court's decisions involving tar-
geted protests, however, it recognizes another component of an
audience's privacy interests that may be intolerably invaded by
speech, the freedom from coercion in decisions related to the pro-
57. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952)).
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
59. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 320-21.
60. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
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test.
m11. PRIVACY OF CHOICE
Targeted protests may interfere improperly with the audience's
privacy interest in making independent decisions on the very issues
involved in the protest. The First Amendment protects protesters'
rights to inform audiences of their view and to persuade them to
adopt the protesters' viewpoint on public issues.63 Yet the circum-
stances of a targeted protest may create pressures upon the audi-
ence which coerce its acceptance of the protesters, views for rea-
sons entirely unrelated to the audience's rational, conscientious, or
autonomous capacity-the manner of decisionmaking underlying the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech.'
The Supreme Court has expressed concern about the coercive
effect of targeted protests. Noting several ways in which the coer-
cive effect arises, this Section explores the Court's concern in
cases involving protests at numerous locations directly before the
targeted audiences. While the Court does not always assert openly
the audience's interest in free and independent choice, its willing-
ness to shield audiences from coercion is overt where targeted
protests occur in the labor relations setting.
A. The Example Found in the Labor Relations Setting
In the labor relations setting, the Supreme Court has upheld
statutory restrictions on speech intended to persuade a targeted
audience to conform its behavior with the speaker's views. While
the presence of federal statutes distinguishes the labor cases from
unregulated arenas in which other targeted protests may occur, the
Court's validation of the statutory restrictions evidences its recogni-
tion of the coercive potential of persuasive speech. By removing
First Amendment protection from speech that coerces the
audience's compliance with the speaker's views, the Court upholds
the audience's interest in retaining free choice in decisions related
to the subject of the speech.
63. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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A federal statute mediates between employers' free speech right
to communicate their views to employees and the dangers inherent
in their attempts to resist unionization.65 Defining unfair labor
practices, the statute explicitly restricts an employer's First Amend-
ment right to express certain views due to the coercive effect of
threatened reprisals or promised benefits on the employee.' An
employer's anti-union efforts constitute First Amendment activity
which, like picketing, directly targets the audience with the intent
to effect its compliance with the speaker's views. An employer's
threats or promises contained in these expressions constitute unlaw-
ful interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization.67
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,68 the Supreme Court ex-
plained the need to subordinate the employer's First Amendment
rights. The petitioner, a Massachusetts producer of wire products,
faced a union campaign after a twelve-year lapse in union repre-
sentation of the company employees.69 Petitioner's president spoke
with all of his employees in an effort to dissuade them from join-
ing the union. Emphasizing that a previous strike had "almost put
[the] company out of business,"7 the president informed employ-
ees that the company was on "'thin ice' financially, that the
Union's 'only weapon [wa]s to strike,' and that a strike 'could lead
to the closing of the plant."' 7 The president also averred that em-
ployees would have difficulty finding reemployment if they lost
their jobs due to their age and the limited usefulness of their
skills.'
To determine the proper scope of employer expression, the
Court asserted the need to consider the particular vulnerability of
employees in the labor relations setting.73  Balancing the
employer's free speech rights with the employees' constitutional
and statutory rights "must take into account the economic depen-
dence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988) prohibits interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployees in the exercise of the right to self-organization.
66. Id. § 158(c).
67. Id.
68. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
69. Id. at 587.
70. Id. at 587-88.
71. Id. at 588.
72. Id. at 588-89.
73. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
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tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dis-
missed by a more disinterested ear."74 Thus, as codified by Con-
gress, an employer's communications to his employees could con-
tain no "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."75
Speech that exploited the employer's economic leverage to control
employees' choice in the labor dispute was impermissible.
As employees were especially vulnerable to the coercive poten-
tial of an employer's speech, the Court also imposed a require-
ment, unusual in First Amendment doctrine,7 6 that the employer's
expression be objectively truthful.' Whereas an employer was free
to communicate to employees any general views about unionization
or even specific opinions about a particular union, any predictions
the employer offered regarding the effects of unionization on the
company were rigorously circumscribed. "[Tihe prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an
employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond
his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at
to close the plant in case of unionization." '78 Absent a truthful
factual basis,79 the expression was a "threat of retaliation based on
misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protection
of the First Amendment." 0
Due to their own economic vulnerability to the effects of tar-
geted protests, third parties to labor disputes also garnered the
Court's protection against the coercive effects of targeted protests.
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001,"1 union protesters
directed their activity toward neutral third parties to a labor dis-
pute. Safeco, an underwriter of real estate title insurance, main-
tained business relationships with five local title companies that
derived over ninety percent of their gross incomes from the sale of
74. Id.
75. Id. at 618.
76. "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently
refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth ... and especially one that puts
the burden of proving truth on the speaker." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271 (1964). Regulating against false speech thwarts the theory that the marketplace best
tests for truth, id. at 270-71, dampens the vigor of public debate, id. at 271-72, and pres-
ents the danger of self-censorship, id. at 279.
77. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 618.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 618-20.
80. Id. at 618.
81. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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Safeco policies. After contract negotiations with management
reached an impasse, Safeco's employees went on strike and picket-
ed the premises of each title company. Carrying signs declaring
that Safeco had no contract with the union, the picketers distributed
handbills asking consumers to support the strike by cancelling their
Safeco policies. 3
Safeco and one of the title companies complained to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, which ordered the union to cease
picketing." The Board's decision rested upon § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act, which makes it an unfair labor
practice "'to threaten, coerce, or restrain' a person not party to a
labor dispute 'where ... an object thereof is .. . forcing or re-
quiring [him] to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer.., or to
cease doing business with any other person. '
The Supreme Court denied that the statutory ban on coercion
of neutrals, as applied to the union's picketing, violated the
protesters' First Amendment rights.8 6 The Court asserted that when
a union's interest in picketing a primary employer at a "one prod-
uct"8" site directly conflicted with the need to protect neutral em-
ployers from the labor disputes of others, "the neutrals' interest
should prevail." 8 Because the sale of Safeco policies accounted
for substantially all of the title companies' business, the Court
agreed that the union's action was "'reasonably calculated to in-
duce customers not to patronize the neutral parties at all.' '89 It
reasoned that continued picketing would force the title companies
to choose "between their survival and the severance of their ties
with Safeco."' The Court condemned the union's tactics as effec-
tively coercing the title companies to pressure Safeco into yielding
to the union's demands. Where picketing so constrained the
82. Id. at 609.
83. Id. at 609-10.
84. Id. at 610.
85. Id. at 611 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1959)).
86. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980).
87. In contrast to where a product picketed is "but one item among many that made
up the retailer's trade," id. at 613, the title companies in this case sold only Safeco's
products. Id.
88. Id. at 612-13.
89. Id. at 610 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754,
757 (1976)).
90. Id. at 615.
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companies' choice, the First Amendment did not protect the
speech.9
Unlike the employer-employee relationship which afforded the
employer's speech its coercive effect in Gissel, the speakers here
lacked any official or contractual authority over their targeted audi-
ence. The Court's validation of the speech restriction recognizes the
relationship between the location of persuasive speech, and the
coercive pressure that may arise from its presence within a certain
environment. Speech that exploited this pressure to coerce the
targeted audience's conformity with the speaker's viewpoint did not
obtain first Amendment protection.
B. Coercion in Targeted Protests
The Supreme Court's overt protection of audiences from coer-
cion in the labor relations setting supports the extension of the
principle to protect other audiences of targeted protests. In numer-
ous circumstances outside the labor context in which the Court
addresses the conflicting interests of protesters and their targeted
audiences, the Court evidences concern for the speech's coercive
potential. Where protests target courthouses, embassies, election
sites, residences, clinics, and schools, particular characteristics of
the audiences shape the Court's response to the scope of the
protesters' First Amendment rights. The cases suggest the Court's
protection of an audience's privacy interest in making decisions
free from coercion in matters related to the protesters' activity.
1. Targeted Protests Affecting Protected Processes
a. Independence of the Judiciary
The audience's particular need for independent decision making
has influenced the Supreme Court's perspective outside the labor
context. When protesters target a courthouse, and the officials
located therein, their First Amendment rights conflict with the
state's interests in protecting the judicial system. Potential harm to
the system stems both from wrongful influence and from
reputational injury based on the appearance of that wrongful influ-
91. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980).
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ence that arise out of the citizens' exercise of their First Amend-
ment rights. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy
of both these audience-related interests.
In Cox v. Louisiana,' a minister active in the civil rights
movement and approximately 2000 black students had convened
upon the courthouse grounds to protest the recent arrest of twenty-
three black students who had picketed stores with segregated lunch
counters.93 The twenty-three students were confined within the
courthouse jail.94 The minister was convicted of violating a state
statute prohibiting picketing or parading "with the intent of interfer-
ing with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or
with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court
officer, in the discharge of his duty . . . in or near a building
housing a court of the State of Louisiana."'95
While the Court overturned the conviction on technical
grounds, dictum suggested the statute was constitutional both on its
face and as applied. "There can be no question that a State has a
legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pres-
sures which picketing near a courthouse might create . .. . [This
statute does not] infringe upon the constitutionally protected rights
of free speech and free assembly."96 Cox protected the state's le-
gitimate interest in insulating those responsible for the impartial ad-
ministration of justice from the effects of protesters' exercise of
First Amendment rights, despite the activity's relation to an impor-
tant public issue.
A comparison of Cox with Bridges v. California,7' an earlier
case involving the impact of criticism of the judiciary on the ad-
ministration of justice, reveals the significance of the protest's
location at the courthouse itself. In Bridges, the Court refused to
assume that publications of criticism of judicial decisions actually
92. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
93. Id. at 538-39.
94. Id. at 539.
95. Id. at 560 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 14:401 (Cum. Supp. 1962)).
96. Id. at 562-63. In a subsequent case, the Court struck down a federal prohibition
against expressive displays showing affiliation with any organization on the grounds of the
United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983). The
Court did not explicitly address whether the dictum of Cox survived this ruling. The Cox
statute may be distinguished as it specifically prohibited expressive activity intended to
interfere with the administration of justice, while the Grace statute proscribed all expres-
sions of affiliation. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
97. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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threatened the impartial nature of legal trials.98 The Court then
considered whether and to what degree the particular publication in
question" presented the substantive evil of unfair administration of
justice.'" As ascribing to the publication any "substantial influ-
ence upon the course of justice would be to impute to judges a
lack of firnmness, wisdom, or honor,"'' 1 the Court refused to re-
strict the speech.
In contrast, where the critical speech occurred at the courthouse
itself, the Cox Court required no evidence of improper influence
upon the judicial process. "The legislature has the right to recog-
nize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials,
will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations
in or near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the tri-
al."10
3
According to the Court, even the appearance of coercive effect
upon the judicial process could justify the subordination of
protesters' First Amendment rights. The Court hypothetically ques-
tioned the effect of a judge's dismissal of an indictment that had
generated substantial picketing calling for its dismissal."4 "A
State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the
public under these circumstances that the judge's action was in part
a product of intimidation and did not flow from the fair and order-
ly working of the judicial process. '""°e Unlike the published
speech protected in Bridges, the targeted protest inherently threat-
ened the administration of justice.
The opinion merely suggests why the Court perceived greater
coercive potential in the targeted protests. First, the Court distin-
guished the courthouse protests from "such a pure form of expres-
sion as newspaper comment or a telegram by a citizen to a public
98. Id. at 271.
99. The speech in question was the publication of several editorials that urged a partic-
ular result in an ongoing labor controversy, id. at 271-72, and a telegram sent by an
officer of a union party, id. at 275. The telegram described a judge's decision on a par-
ticular dispute as "outrageous" and suggested that if the decision were enforced the union
would call a strike affecting the entire Pacific Coast. Id. at 275-76. The publisher and
union officer were found guilty of contempt of court. Id. at 258.
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id. at 273.
102. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941). The Court reversed the convic-
tions.
103. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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official,"'" as was protected in Bridges. The mix of pure expres-
sion and conduct implicated the Court's concern for the speech's
effect upon others."° Second, the Court noted that the judges re-
sponsible for ruling upon the legality of the students' arrest were
in the building during the pyotests.'0° Both the conduct element of
the speech, as well as its immediacy to its target, contributed to its
coercive potential.
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the im-
portance of ensuring both the independence of its own decision
making process from targeted protests, as well as the appearance of
improper influence. In United States v. Grace,"° the Supreme
Court heard a First Amendment challenge to a federal law
prohibiting "the 'display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed
or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or
movement' in the United Supreme Court building and on its
grounds."" Addressing only the proscriptions as applied to the
public sidewalks along the perimeter of the Supreme Court
grounds,"' the Court acknowledged the statute's general purpose
of protecting the building and grounds and the persons and proper-
ty therein, as well as maintaining proper order and decorum." 2
As in Cox, the Court approved of the state's interest in pro-
moting the independence of the judiciary from attempts, external to
the legal process, to influence its decisions."3 The federal courts
represent an independent branch of the government; courts "are not
subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their cham-
bers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved one way or
another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picket-
106. Id. at 564.
107. The Court's distinction may be read as simply alluding to the lower scrutiny of
speech that mixes expression with conduct. "The Government generally has a freer hand
in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word."
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). However, restrictions on picketing involving
public issues have never been accorded lower scrutiny; in fact, they obtain very careful
scrutiny. See supra note 5.
108. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
109. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
110. Id. at 172-73 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 13k).
111. The individuals threatened with arrest under the statute had appeared individually
on the public sidewalks to engage in expressive activity; the Court limited the scope of
its analysis accordingly. Id. at 175.
112. Id. at 182.
113. Id. at 183.
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ing or pressure groups.'. 4
Moreover, as in Cox, the Court endorsed the state's interest in
the appearance of the judiciary's freedom from improper influence
in rendering decisions. "Neither... should it appear to the public
that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence or that pick-
eting or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or proper
way of appealing to or influencing the Supreme Court.""... Al-
though it concluded the statute did not sufficiently serve these
interests," 6 the Court refused to discount the special need to pre-
serve the existence and appearance of the judiciary's independence
from concerted, external efforts to influence its decisions."7
b. Independence of Government Diplomats
The Court has also overtly promoted the interest of government
diplomats in remaining free from coercion in decisionmaking, al-
though it has been less enthusiastic about restricting speech that
merely injures the diplomats' reputation. In Boos v. Barry,"'
three individuals who wished to carry signs critical of foreign
governments challenged a District of Columbia regulation restrict-
ing expressive activity within 500 feet of a foreign embassy. ' 9
The Court condoned the protection of diplomats from expressive
acts or attempts to intimidate, coerce, or harass them, which were
punishable under an existing criminal statute.' However, the
114. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see supra note 96.
117. Id.
118. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
119. The relevant portion of the statute read as follows:
It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or
adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign govern-
ment, party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into
public disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any
foreign government, party or organization . . . within 500 feet of any building
or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign
government or its representative or resentatives as an embassy, legation, consul-
ate, or for other official purposes . . . or to congregate within 500 feet of any
such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so
to do by the police authorities of said District.
li at 316 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981)).
120. The Court compared the ordinance to an analogous federal statute which imposed
criminal punishment for willful acts or attempts to "intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass
a foreign official or an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of
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Court questioned whether protecting the dignity of foreign officials
also constituted a compelling government interest.
According to the Court, the First Amendment requires Ameri-
can citizens to tolerate insulting and even outrageous speech in
public debate; the Court was unpersuaded that any differences
between foreign officials and American citizens required deviation
from this principle.'2 ' At the same time, the Court noted the
United States' obligations under international law to protect the
premises of foreign emissaries against intrusion and the impairment
of the officials' dignity," as well as the nation's self-interest in
protecting the dignitaries as an essential component of its own
international relations." Because the less speech-restrictive crimi-
nal provision already protected the diplomats from coercion or
harassment, the Court declined to resolve whether the state's inter-
est in the officials' dignity were compelling.14 The Court per-
ceived no special need of diplomats, unlike the judiciary, to pre-
serve their reputation for independent decisionmaking that justified
additional protection.
c. Independence of the Electorate
The Court recently evidenced its willingness to protect voters
from intimidation and coercion in the election process. In Burson
v. Freeman,"s the Court upheld a Tennessee law prohibiting the
solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign
materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling site.26 The
"campaign free zone" ' served a compelling government interest
in "protecting the rights of . . .citizens to vote freely for the can-
didates of their choice [and in protecting] the right to vote in an
election conducted with integrity and reliability."'" The evil of
his duties." Id. at 324-25 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)). Categorizing the federal statute
as a less restrictive alternative to the District of Columbia ordinance, the Court accepted
the argument that prevention of coercion may justify restrictions upon First Amendment
freedoms. Id. at 325-26.
121. Id. at 326-27.
122. Id.
123. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1988).
124. Id. at 329.
125. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
126. Id. at 1848.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1851.
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voter intimidation, combined with the state's interest in preventing
election fraud, withstood the Court's strict scrutiny to justify a
complete ban on expressive activity within the zone. 9 Presum-
ably, the proximity of the persuasive speech to its targeted audi-
ence increased its potential to influence improperly voters' indepen-
dent decisionmaking.
2. Targeted Protests Affecting Protected Environments
Compared to the overt protection of the audiences' interest in
retaining independent choice in the labor relations, courthouse, and
electioneering settings, the Court's concern for the coercive effect
of a protest targeting a residence, clinic, or school is less obvious.
Its presence, however, can be seen throughout the Court's opinions,
and may help explain the outcome in cases in which protesters
challenge restrictions of their activities on First Amendment
grounds.
a. Residences
In Frisby v. Schultz, the home constituted a sanctified realm,
the tranquility and privacy of which supported a ban on residential
picketing.' ° Due to the inherently private nature of the home, an
audience's interest in being free from forced exposure to objection-
able speech was particularly acute when the audience was captive
within the home.' Reviewing cases in which a homeowner con-
fronted protests targeted against him, however, exposes the Court's
concern not simply for the harm implicit in the invasion itself, but
for the coercive potential of the speech due to the disruptive effect
of its intrusion.
The sanctity of the home does not- automatically mandate
against protests located there. In Gregory v. City of Chicago,'32
the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for leading a
march of approximately eighty-five protesters before the home of
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. Protesting segregation in the city's
129. Id. at 1857-58. The dissent sharply criticized the "broad, antiseptic sweep" of the
zone, which encompassed at least 30,000 square feet. Id. at 1861 (Stevens, J., dissenting.).
130. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
132. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
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public schools, the protestors arrived at the mayor's home in the
evening and marched continuously around the block. While 100
police stood by, the protesters sang civil rights songs and chanted
criticism of the mayor. After half an hour, the protesters quieted
but continued to march carrying critical signs.133
An hour later, a crowd of about 1000 white spectators became
unruly, throwing rocks and eggs and threatening the marchers.
Police requested that the protesters disperse. The defendant refused
to end the demonstration, resulting in the protesters' arrest.'34
Finding no evidence of the protesters' disorderly conduct, the Su-
preme Court unanimously overturned their convictions and held
their actions protected by the First Amendment.'35
While the decision of the Court declined to address the privacy
issue explicitly, Justice Black confronted the potential conflict be-
tween the protesters' choice of locale and the state's interest in
protecting those affected:
No mandate in our Constitution leaves States and govern-
mental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public
from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that
disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people . . .
for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of the
outside business and political world. 36
Because the home constituted a sanctified escape from the stresses
of every day life, the Constitution reserved the state's right to
shield it from invasive speech.
A decade later, the Chicago mayor's home was the site of
another demonstration involving the segregation of the public
schools. In Carey v. Brown,'37 the city convicted the protesters
under an Illinois statute that prohibited picketing before a residence
or dwelling unless the dwelling were used as a place of business,
or the protester were the homeowner.'38 While the Supreme Court
133. Id.
134. Id. at 112.
135. Id. at 113.
136. Id. at 118 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black noted that occupants of other
buildings similarly require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as courts,
libraries, schools, and hospitals. Id. To mediate among the conflicting interests, Justice
Black encouraged the drafting of narrowly drawn time, place, or manner restrictions de-
signed to regulate certain kinds of picketing. Id.
137. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
138. The applicable statute provided:
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reversed the conviction on the grounds that the statute
impermissibly distinguished between peaceful labor picketing and
other peaceful picketing, 39 the Court affirmed the countervailing
legitimacy of residential privacy interests against a speaker's First
Amendment rights. According to the Court, the "State's interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society."'"
Moreover, the Court's opinion suggested that homeowners' privacy
interests persist even if their own expressive initiatives seem to
invite response. 4' However, the Court maintained that the resi-
dential privacy interest was not absolute. 42 As evidenced by
Gregory and Carey, in which the Court perceived no threat of
coercion from the speakers, the simple presence of unwanted
speech at the home did not rise to an essentially intolerable inva-
sion.
Frisby, in which the Court upheld a ban on residential picket-
ing, 43 offers insight into what rendered the Brookfield protests an
intolerable privacy invasion. Beyond the disturbance of the tranquil
environment, the Court perceived something else threatening in the
protests' narrow targeting of the household. The intrusive means of
communication had a particularly offensive effect. "'To those in-
side ... the home becomes something less than a home when and
while the picketing ... continue[s] .... [The] tensions and pres-
sures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that
reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquil-
It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any per-
son, except when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business.
However, this Article does not apply to a person peacefully picketing his own
residence or dwelling and does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of
employment involved in a labor dispute or the place of holding a meeting or
assembly on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public
interest.
Id. at 457 (citing ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, I 21.1-2 (1977)).
139. Id. at 455.
140. Id. at 471.
141. The state's attorney defended the statute's exception for labor-related picketing by
arguing that a homeowner, by converting his dwelling into a place of employment, "di-
lutes" or "waives" his entitlement to privacy. Id. at 468. The Court attacked the argument
by describing numerous other circumstances in which it might then be argued that a
homeowner vitiates his right to residential privacy. Id. at 469.
142. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) ("Standing alone, then, the State's
asserted interest in promoting the privacy of the home is not sufficient to save the stat-
ute:).
143. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
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ity.""'  By acknowledging the psychological pressures, the Court
recognized the coercive potential that arises from the presence of
the speech in and around the protected environment of the home,
and the danger that the intrusion may induce the audience's com-
pliance with the protesters' viewpoint.
The majority explicitly considered the protesters' intent to use
offensive speech to effect the doctor's compliance with their views:
The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance
generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the
general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident,
and to do so in an especially offensive way .. . . In this
case, for example, [the picketers] subjected the doctor and
his family to the presence of a relatively large group of
protesters on their doorstep in an attempt to force the doc-
tor to cease performing abortions.'45
Despite the protest's role in public debate, the Court perceived
something "disturbing"'" in the protesters' presence at the
doctor's home as a means of persuasion. Suggesting that residential
privacy included protection against the discomfort of "knowing that
a stranger lurks outside [the] home,"'47 the majority concluded
that "'the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home""'
was a legitimate "evil"' 49 against which the government could
regulate.5 '
The dissent more explicitly propounded the coercive potential
of the targeted protest. Noting that the "the mere fact that speech
takes place in a residential neighborhood does not automatically
implicate a residential privacy interest,"'' the dissent concluded
that it was "the intrusion of speech into the home or the unduly
coercive nature of a particular manner of speech around the home
that is subject to more exacting regulation."'52 Speech that exhib-
ited either one of these characteristics was subject to regulation. 3
144. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
145. Id. at 486-87.
146. Id. at 487.
147. Id. (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
148. Id. (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
149. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
150. Id. at 487-88.
151. Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("But so long as the speech remains outside the
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The dissent specified certain aspects of the picketers' expres-
sive activity that exhibited coerciveness. Attendance at the protests
regularly reached up to forty people." 4 In addition to carrying
signs and shouting slogans, the protesters "warned young children
not to go near the house because [the doctor] was a 'baby kill-
er.""' 155  Groups of protesters repeatedly trespassed onto the
doctor's property and at least once blocked the exits to his
home. 6 As expressive and persuasive as they were, such activi-
ties were "intrusive and coercive abuses' 17 of the First Amend-
ment guarantee of free speech. While the dissent denied that the
prohibition was sufficiently tailored to prevent only coercive
speech, it unquestionably accepted the government's constitutional
ability to prevent or neutralize the coercive elements through regu-
lation.'58
The absence of tailoring to control only the coercive potential
of a residential protest explains the Court's invalidation of a simi-
lar restriction on residential picketing in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc. 9 Respondents in the action operated several
abortion clinics throughout central Florida. Petitioners engaged in
picketing and demonstrations near the site of one of respondents'
clinics located in the town of Melbourne. An initial injunction
forbade the protesters from blocking or interfering with public
access to the abortion clinic and from physically abusing persons
entering or leaving the clinic.
While this injunction was in effect, groups protested in front of
home and does not unduly coerce the occupant, the government's heightened interest in
protecting residential privacy is not implicated.").
154. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 494 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. ("Surely it is within the government's power to enact regulations as necessary
to prevent such intrusive and coercive abuses.").
The willingness of a majority of the Court to protect a homeowner against the coer-
cive effects of a protest targeted against him or her appears in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), in which the Court recognized the speech's potential to
drive a homeowner out of his home. In R.A.V., a teenager burned a cross on a black
family's lawn and was charged under an ordinance prohibiting such conduct. Id. at 2541.
Though the Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutionally discriminatory on the basis
of content, the Court affirmed the compelling nature of the interest advanced by the ordi-
nance: "to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in
peace where they wish." Id. at 2549.
159. 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
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clinic employees' residences, shouting at passersby, ringing
neighbors' doorbells offering literature that identified the employees
as baby killers, and occasionally confronting the minor children of
clinic employees who were home alone."6° In response to this and
other activity continuing at the abortion clinic, the state court
broadened the injunction to include a prohibition against protesting
within a 300-foot buffer zone of staff residences. 16  Protesters
challenged the constitutionality of the amended injunction in both
state and federal courts. 1
62
Although every Justice concluded that the injunction against
picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification equipment
within 300 feet of the residences of an abortion clinic's staff was
insufficiently tailored to justify the restriction of the protesters'
First Amendment freedom, the majority cited Frisby in recognition
of the state's interest in protecting the "well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home." 63 However, no opinion further developed
the Justices' perspectives on the nature of residential privacy."6
As its only justification for the different outcome, the majority
distinguished between the Frisby ordinance's prohibition against
focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular resi-
dence, 65 and the 300-foot buffer zone. The Court noted that the
buffer zone encompassed streets that provided the sole access to
streets on which staff residences were located, and concluded that
the zone would impermissibly ban marching through residential
160. Id. at 2521.
161. Id. at 2522. The relevant portion of the injunction proscribed the following activity:
At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound amplification equipment within
[300] feet of the residence of any of the [clinic's] employees, staff, owners or
agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner,
temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways of the resi-
dences of any of the [clinic's] employees, staff, owners or agents. The [protest-
ers] and those acting in concert with them are prohibited from inhibiting or
impeding or attempting to impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or
egress of persons to any street that provides the sole access to the street on
which those residences are located.
Id.
162. Id. at 2523.
163. Id. at 2530.
164. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530-31 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2531-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2534-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
165. Id. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477). See supra note 37.
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neighborhoods or blocks of houses as well.'"
The Court's emphasis on tailoring the residential picketing
prohibition to restrict only speech directed toward the targeted
individual substantiates the hypothesis that its underlying concern,
in both Frisby and Madseh, was the coercive effect of the speech
rather than a more general willingness to protect homeowners
against unwanted intrusions into the sanctity of the home.'67 All
homeowners, not simply the targeted doctor, possess the right to
enjoy a tranquil home environment. A 300-foot buffer zone would
protect each resident from environmental invasions by the speech,
yet the Madsen court condemned the restriction's coverage of First
Amendment activity not targeted against one particular homeowner.
While antiabortion protesters may picket an abortion doctor's home
to communicate their stance to the doctor's neighbors and to any
citizens who learn of the activity, they presumably seek to obtain
behavioral conformity from the targeted abortion doctor. A ban on
picketing a single residence, as upheld in Frisby, might not protect
homeowners' rights to enjoy tranquil home environments,'68 but.
may reduce the coercive effect of the protest upon the target's
choice to continue performing abortions.
The similar needs of the audiences and detrimental effects of
environmental invasions that pique the Court's concern for the
coercive effects of residential picketing also appear in protests that
target clinics and schools. 69 In addressing the competing interests
of speaker and audience in such environments, the Court does not
explicitly relate the effect of the speech upon the audience's
166. Id. at 2529-30.
167. See supra note 34. A difference in scrutiny might explain the divergent results be-
tween Frisby and Madsen. The injunction in Madsen, according to the majority, obtained
stricter scrutiny than the Court would apply to a generally applicable statute that similarly
restricted the speech. For such an ordinance, the Court would inquire whether the "time,
place and manner regulations were narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest." Id. at 2524 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
In contrast, the Madsen majority asked whether the injunction "burden[ed] no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 2525. However, without
the narrowing construction imposed by the majority which enabled it to find the ordinance
prohibited only picketing before a single residence, a construction not reached by either
lower court, the Frisby ban is at least as broad as the Madsen restriction. The Court's
imposition of this construction belies its assertion of heightened scrutiny.
168. Marching through residential neighborhoods or blocks of houses could intolerably
invade many homes' peaceful environments, at least as much as a protest targeted at a
single residence. Moreover, such environmental invasions may trigger the existing public
safety ordinances mentioned in Frisby. See supra note 34.
169. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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choice. However, its emphasis on the audience-related harms im-
posed by the disruption of these special environments suggests the
relevance of the speech's coercive potential in influencing its opin-
ions.
b. Clinics
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,70 the Supreme
Court addressed the conflict between the First Amendment rights of
protesters who directed their expressive activities against an abor-
tion clinic, and the interests of the targeted, captive audience, the
clinic's patients and staff.' The Court considered the constitu-
tionality of several provisions of a state court injunction restricting
First Amendment activity around the clinic:' 1) a thirty-six-foot
buffer zone around the clinic's property, within which the protest-
ers were barred from activity; 2) a restriction on excessive noise
levels during the clinic's operating hours; 3) the use of images
observable to patients inside the clinic; and 4) a prohibition against
protesters physically approaching those seeking the clinic's services
who did not consent to talk.' The Court's analysis detailed sev-
eral audience-related interests that the state could legitimately pro-
tect through limitations upon the protesters' First Amendment
rights. In determining whether the various provisions of the injunc-
tion were narrowly tailored to advance these interests, the Court
articulated what expressive activity intolerably intruded upon the
audience, versus what it regarded was an acceptable burden upon
the audience to avoid the objectionable speech.
The Court accepted as significant two general audience-related
interests protected by the injunction. First, it noted patients' free-
dom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection
with pregnancy. 74 Second, the Court analogized residential priva-
cy to medical privacy: "[While targeted picketing of the home
threatens the psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident,
170. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
171. The Court found that the picketing was directed primarily at patients and staff of
the clinic. Id. at 2527.
172. As already discussed, the injunction also contained a provision for a 300-foot buff-
er zone around the residences of clinic staff. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying
text.
173. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521-30.
174. Id. at 2526 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the
psychological, but the physical well-being of the patient held
'captive' by medical circumstance."'75 In combination with ensur-
ing public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on
public streets and sidewalks, and protecting citizens' property
rights, the Court concluded, the state's interest in protecting these
rights of the targeted audience was sufficient to justify an appropri-
ately tailored restriction on protesters' expressive activity.'76
Assessing the constitutionality of the thirty-six-foot buffer
zone," the Court acknowledged the restriction's purpose of pro-
tecting unfettered ingress to and egress from the clinic.' Com-
paring the experience of attempting to enter the clinic to "[run]ning
a gauntlet," '79 the Court emphasized the adverse impact of
the protests upon patients. According to testimony given in the
lower court, patients exhibited a higher level of anxiety and hy-
pertension, resulting in the need for higher levels of sedation dur-
ing the surgical procedures, thereby increasing the risk associated
with such procedures.' Moreover, scheduled patients who did
not enter the clinic because of the crowd and returned later in-
creased their health risks by delaying treatment.'
While the Court distinctly asserted the state's strong interest in
protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling
services in connection with her pregnancy, it did not assert the
predominance of female patients' rights to access the building.
Rather, in agreeing to restrict the protesters' expressive activity
around the clinic entrances and driveway, the Court considered the
fact that protesters had repeatedly interfered with free access of
175. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)).
176. Id.
177. The relevant provisions of the injunction prohibited the protesters from engaging in
the following acts:
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in any
other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into and egress
from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demon-
strating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property within
[36] feet of the property line of the Clinic ....
Id. at 2521-22.
178. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994).
179. Id. at 2521.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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both patients and staff.82 By including in its analysis the staff's
interest in accessing the building, the Court implied that it was not
only the protests' direct interference with an identifiable constitu-
tional right-the patients' right to medical and counseling services
regarding pregnancy-that supported the restriction. Interfering in
the daily, required activities of staff members contributed to the
Court's willingness to limit the protesters' First Amendment
rights. 83
The Court also elucidated the audience's interests protected by
a restriction on noise levels around the clinic during its operating
hours. 84 Beyond its recognition of the captivity imposed by med-
ical circumstances,"'5 the Court considered the special vulnera-
bility and needs of individuals in hospital environments.
"Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or assembly
plants. They are hospitals, where human ailments are treat-
ed, where patients and relatives alike often are under emo-
tional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting
patients are principal facets of the day's activity, and where
the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered,
relaxing, and helpful atmosphere."'
86
Weighing evidence that confronting the noise inside the clinic
impaired patients' well-being,'87 the Court refused to place the
burden of avoiding the objectionable noise upon patients. "The
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facili-
ty undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political
protests."'88 Patients' health and well-being was legitimately pro-
182. Id. at 2526.
183. Conversely, absent interference with accessing the building or otherwise interfering
with the clinic's operation, the protesters' First Amendment activities could not be restrict-
ed within the thirty-six foot buffer zone. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114
S. Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994).
184. "During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays through Saturdays,
during surgical procedures and recovery periods, [the injunction prohibited the protesters
from] singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound
amplification equipment or other sounds . . . within earshot of the patients inside the
clinic." Id. at 2522.
185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S.
773, 783-84 (1979)).
187. The Court cited testimony given in lower court that noise produced by the protest-
ers and heard within the clinic caused stress in patients both during surgical procedures
and while recuperating in recovery rooms. Id. at 2521.
188. Id. at 2528.
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tected through a noise restriction.'89
In contrast, avoiding objectionable "images observable"' 9' to
patients inside the clinic was an acceptable burden. "[I]t is much
easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up
her ears, and no more is required to avoid seeing placards through
the windows of the clinic."'' While the state could legitimately
prohibit the display of signs that could be interpreted as threats,
the First Amendment rights of the protesters to display signs out-
weighed the state's interest in reducing the anxiety of patients
inside the clinic.
Preventing the audience's intimidation by the protesters was
also a significant state interest. The injunction prevented protesters
within 300 feet of the clinic from physically approaching any per-
son seeking the services of the clinic "unless such person indi-
cate[d] a desire to communicate."'" Based on findings that
throughout the protests "sidewalk counselors"'93 approached vehi-
cles heading toward the clinic, attempting to give occupants anti-
abortion literature, and that protesters had physically abused per-
sons entering or leaving the clinic, the state court sought "to pre-
vent clinic patients and staff from being 'stalked' or 'shadowed' by
protesters."'94 Comparing the confrontation between the antiabor-
tion protesters and those seeking the clinic's services to "skillful,
and unprincipled, solicitor[s']"' 9' face-to-face contact with particu-
larly vulnerable and captive targets, the Court suggested that the
risks of duress may justify regulation.'96 However, the First
Amendment protected the protesters' opportunity to reach even the
unwilling audience. Absent evidence that protesters' speech con-
tained direct threats, which would render it otherwise proscribable,
the Court insisted that the audience either tolerate the protected
speech or assume the burden of avoiding it.'"
189. Id. at 2528.
190. The injunction also banned all "images observable to . . . the patients inside the
Clinic." Id. at 2522.
191. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2521.
194. Id. at 2529.
195. Id. (quoting International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2708 (1992)).
196. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994).
197. Id. at 2529.
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c. Schools
When protesters directed their activities toward a school, simi-
lar special needs of the targeted audience have justified limitations
on the protesters' First Amendment rights. In Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 9 8 approximately 200 students, family and friends con-
vened next to the grounds of a senior high school. The demonstra-
tion followed unsuccessful attempts to resolve racial grievances
with school administrators.' Carrying signs advocating black
equality among the student body and school staff and raising their
fists in the 'power to the people' sign, the protesters marched
within 100 feet of the school building."° Disputed testimony
complained of chanting and other noise that was audible in the
school, of students lining classroom windows to watch the demon-
stration or leaving class to join the protest, of uncontrolled lateness
for classes due to students watching the demonstration, and of
general disruptions in orderly school procedures."'
Following a warning, police arrested forty demonstrators, in-
cluding the appellant. The appellant was convicted under two ordi-
nances, one prohibiting picketing or demonstrating within 150 feet
of a school building during school hours,' 2 and one prohibiting
making noise or diversion which disturbs the order of a school
session. 3 While the Court reversed the antipicketing conviction
on equal protection grounds, the Court allowed the restriction upon
198. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
199. Id. at 105.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The antipicketing ordinance provided that:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or
secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has
been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute . ...
Id. at 107 (citing Code of Ordinances, c. 28 § 18.1(i)).
203. The relevant portion of the antinoise ordinance is as follows:
[N]o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in
which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist
in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of such school session or class thereof . ...
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972) (citing Code of Ordinances,
c.28 § 19.2(a)).
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First Amendment activities that disrupted normal school order.
The "'special characteristics of the school environment"'" 4 in-
fluenced the Court's analysis. The Court acknowledged the impor-
tance of public schools as community institutions and often the
focus of significant grievances.' Further, it noted the effective-
ness of daytime picketing on public grounds near schools.2'
Thus, the Court suggested, quiet, unintrusive picketing could not be
proscribed.' However, recognizing the interests of the "stu-
dent/faculty 'audience,""'2 8 the Court refused to require schools to
tolerate "boisterous demonstrators who drown out classroom con-
versation, make studying impossible, block entrances, or incite chil-
dren to leave the schoolhouse."
The state's compelling interest in having undisrupted school
sessions conducive to students' learning justified the restriction on
protesters' First Amendment rights." ' Similar to antiabortion pro-
tests at clinics and staff residences designed to induce the targets'
conformity with protesters' views, school protests gain persuasive
strength from the disruptive effects upon the school's operation.
The Court's concern for the student and faculty audience in
Grayned suggests that responsible administrators may face similar
pressures to conform school policies to the protesters' viewpoints
in order to maintain the school's order and tranquil environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's approach to determining when a targeted
protest intolerably invades the privacy interests of the targeted
audience is not easily articulated. While it relies on the principles
of the offensive speech and captive audience cases to assess the
magnitude of the environmental disturbance created by the speech,
the Court has expressed concern for the facet of the audience's
privacy that involves freedom from the coercive effect of the
204. Id. at 117 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
205. Id. at 118.
206. Id. at 119.
207. Id.
208. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972).
209. Id. at 119.
210. Id. Because the ordinance punished only conduct that disrupted or was about to
disrupt normal school activities, the Court found the ordinance narrowly tailored to the
state's legitimate interest. Id.
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speech on the audience's decisionmaking. The Court's opposition to
speech that contains direct threats is apparent, particularly in the
labor relations setting,21' and is suggested in the residential and
abortion protest contexts. Yet the Court also exhibits concern that
the disturbance created by the protests can impose coercive pres-
sure upon the targets. Targeted doctors whose families and patients
must endure the protests may feel this pressure,2 1' as may neutral
parties to labor disputes whose customers are diverted by pro-
tests2"3 or school administrators whose students suffer from the
disruption of their activities. 214 When the protest targets a court-
house, the Court seems to fear the coercive effect the protest's
very presence may have upon the targeted audience; the appear-
ance, before the public, of improper influence is a concurrent dan-
ger.2
15
Regulating speech according to its persuasiveness directly con-
flicts with the First Amendment's glorification of the marketplace
of ideas as a mechanism for ascertaining truth."' The Supreme
Court has affirmed in unambiguous terms the First Amendment
right to use objectionable or challenging speech to change or even
to coerce behavior. "Speech does not lose its protected charac-
ter . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action." ' 7 However, the targeted protest cases substantiate
the fact that coercive speech may be a potentially intolerable inva-
sion of the target's privacy interests in retaining free choice in
matters related to the protesters' activity.
Under several First Amendment theories, the coerciveness of
speech may be a valid factor in balancing the interests of speaker
and audience. For example, the Court's concern regarding the over-
ly intrusive and coercive nature of residential picketing conforms
with First Amendment theories promoting rational self-government,
individual autonomy, and tolerance.2 The general hostility to
forcing a captive audience's exposure to offensive speech is exacer-
bated by the symbolic and practical29 entrenchment of the home-
211. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
217. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
218. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
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owner within the home. Because of this entrenchment, the invasion
by the speech poses a particularly severe psychological threat."
Additionally, the picketing may disrupt the home's functioning;
protests may include noise invasions that threaten tranquility, inter-
ference with residents' and neighbors' comings and goings, and
even contact with children that violates a sense of the home's
security.
Should the target change her view or behavior to match the
protester's, her decision is not likely a rational or even conscien-
tious choice to conform to an ideology she now perceives as true
in the marketplace of ideas. Rather, only by conforming could she
be relieved of the intrusions and disruption. While the practical
entrenchment and security concerns may be greatest in the residen-
tial context, targeted protests in other contexts may impose equally
stringent pressures. A decision based on such coercive pressures
does not further intelligent self-government, individual autonomy,
or tolerance.
ANNE D. LEDERMAN
220. See supra notes 38, 144-58 and accompanying text.
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